Moral Epistemology

Spring 2009
Maggie Little

Jan. 27  Reasoning From Example
Onora O’Neil, “The Power of Example”

Feb. 3  Reasoning from Counter-Examples
Lance & Little, “Where the Laws Are”
Weatherson, “What Good are Counter-Examples?”

Feb. 10  Challenges from Empirical Moral Psychology
Sosa, “Experimental Philosophy”
Prinz, “Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?”
Appiah, “The Case Against Intuition”

Feb. 17  Morality & Evolutionary Biology
Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”
Joyce, “The Moral Sense”

Feb. 24  Social Constructivism: Law v. Morality
Marmor, “How Law is Like Chess”
Hart, The Concept of Law, selections

March 3  Naturalism
Peter Railton, “Moral Realism”
Owen Flanagan, “Quinean Ethics”
Horgan & Timmons, “Moral Twin Earth”

March 10  (Spring Break)

March 17  Non-Naturalism
McDowell, “Virtue as Reason”, “Non-Cognitivism & Rule-Following”

March 24  Response-Dependency
Wiggins, “A Sensible Subjectivism?”

March 31  Beyond Propositional Knowledge
Little, “Virtue as Knowledge”
Gilbert Ryle, “What Is It to Forget Right and Wrong?”
McGee, “The Inadequacy of Linguistic Philosophy”

April 7  **Social Worlds & Concept Evolution**
Bernard Williams, *Ethics & the Limits of Philosophy*, selection
Warren Quinn, “Reflection & the Loss of Moral Knowledge”

April 14  Stuart Hampshire, “Moral Conflict”
Alasdair Macintyre, “In Defense of Tradition”

April 21  **Moral Status**
Anderson, “Animals”